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Abstract: This Essay is a case study of how and why strict scrutiny varies
between cases decided within a particular doctrinal category (political speech)
by a given court (the Roberts Court). Two lines of Roberts Court jurisprudence
implicate political speech: federal campaign finance cases and a challenge to
the federal statute criminalizing “material support” to designated foreign
terrorist organizations. My aim here is to examine the common doctrinal
matrix of First Amendment strict scrutiny used in those cases to explore how
divergent results emerge from a unified analytic framework. A secondary goal
is to illustrate how post-9/11 national security concerns find expression inside
familiar and seemingly durable doctrinal frameworks.
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A central concern in First Amendment jurisprudence is the proper scope
of government authority to regulate speech on matters of national political
concern.1 Such speech supposedly secures heightened protection via a “strict
scrutiny” test that has long been glossed as “fatal in fact.”2 Strict scrutiny
demands that measures be “‘narrowly tailored’” to address a “‘compelling
government interest.’”3 Recent scholarship, however, has demonstrated that
strict scrutiny is internally variegated. Under its rubric, courts in fact employ
different methodologies4 and varying degrees of stringency.5
This Essay is a case study of how and why strict scrutiny varies between
cases decided within a particular doctrinal category (political speech) by a
given court (the Roberts Court). Two lines of Roberts Court jurisprudence
implicate political speech. First, the Court has invalidated several state and
federal campaign finance laws.6 Second, it has upheld a federal statute
criminalizing “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations
(“FTOs”).7 These lines of precedent are more alike, I will argue, than first
appearances suggest. Both can be colorably read to involve state efforts to
regulate the national political marketplace. Both also implicate a compelling
government interest in preserving democracy (albeit from a pair of distinct
internal and external threats). Yet doctrinal propinquity yields no convergence
in outcomes. In the Roberts Court, the government prevails when defending
democracy against external threats but loses against internal corruption. My
aim here is to examine the common doctrinal matrix of First Amendment strict
scrutiny to explain how such divergent results can emerge from a unified
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“The Free
Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters . . . .”).
2. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972).
3. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); accord Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (“To satisfy
strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that [the] legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.”).
4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1301–11 (2007)
(arguing strict scrutiny might be characterized as categorical rule, weighted balancing test, or
heuristic to identify measures animated by unconstitutional ends).
5. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 796–97 (2006) (finding, based on survey of
cases, about one in three laws survive strict scrutiny challenges, but survival rate varies according
to right at issue).
6. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011)
(invalidating matching subsidy element in Arizona’s public financing system); Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating federal bar on corporate and union expenditures on
election-related speech close to date of polling); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008)
(invalidating so-called millionaire’s amendment in federal campaign finance law); FEC v. Wisc.
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2663–66 (2007) (accepting as-applied challenge to bar on
corporate speech close to elections).
7. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730–31 (2010) (rejecting asapplied challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), one of several material support
provisions).
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analytic framework (rather than, say, to explore how exogenous political or
social forces might be used to explain the doctrine). A secondary goal is to
illustrate how post-9/11 national security concerns find expression inside
familiar and seemingly durable doctrinal frameworks.
I begin in Part I by briefly sketching the two lines of cases. Part II
examines how and why the severity of the Court’s scrutiny modulates across
the two contexts. Part III then demonstrates that even when the Court applies
the same formal doctrinal rule across cases, that rule can have divergent
downstream effects. I end on a note of skepticism about possible justifications
for observed intradoctrinal variances.
I.
Initially, the Supreme Court sorted campaign finance laws into
(permissible) regulation of contributions to candidates or parties on the one
hand, and (impermissible) regulation of independent expenditures on the
other.8 The Court explained that “[r]estraints on expenditures generally curb
more expressive associational activity than limits on contributions do” while
“limits on contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political
corruption.”9 Yet a moment’s reflection reveals that the line between spending
oneself and giving money to a candidate is hardly self-evident in practice:
What if instead of donating money to a candidate, I contact them to see what
kind of advertising they need and proceed accordingly? Acknowledging this
fuzzy edge, the Court draws a “functional, not a formal, line” between truly
independent expenditures and expenditures with a candidate’s “approval (or
wink or nod).”10 The latter count as contributions. Hence, the truly important
doctrinal distinction—the de facto boundary between highly protected speech
and vulnerability to campaign finance regulation—is between independent and
coordinated speech.
On both sides of the independent/coordinated divide, the Roberts Court
has innovated in a deregulatory direction. Early in the new Chief’s tenure, the
Court invalidated Vermont limits on individual contributions to political
candidates as beneath “some lower bound” of constitutionality.11 On the
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1974) (per curium) (invalidating independent
expenditure limitation provision of Federal Election Campaign Finance Act of 1971); see also
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–88 (2000) (noting contribution limits “would
more readily clear the hurdles before them”); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
259–60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less
compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.”).
9. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440–41 (2001).
10. Id. at 442–43. The FEC treats “extensive consultations with the campaign staff of certain
candidates regarding the distribution of its voter guides and other materials turned otherwise
permissible campaign-related materials into illegal in-kind campaign contributions.” FEC v.
Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48–49 (D.D.C. 1999). “Coordination” is defined by
regulation. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2011).
11. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246–62 (2006) (invalidating limitations on individual
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independent expenditure side of the line, Citizens United v. FEC struck down a
federal bar upon the use of corporate funds for electioneering
communications.12 And in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, the Court invalidated an Arizona public financing scheme in which
a privately funded candidate’s decision to exceed a stated expenditure ceiling
triggered increased funding for candidates supported by the public purse.13 To
many commentators who favor campaign finance reform, these decisions
sounded a death knell for the comprehensive regulation of money in politics.
After Citizens United, some argued, independent entities such as political
action committees and 527 organizations14 would become vehicles for
unlimited spending, fostering more of what some perceive to be undesirable
bonds of obligation between office holders and a limited pool of unaccountable
interest groups.15
Importantly, strict scrutiny applies, albeit in different ways, on each side
of the independent/coordinated divide. On the one hand, the Court reviews
independent expenditure restrictions under a truly strict scrutiny standard.16
For example, Citizens United catalogued the absence of evidence that
corporate expenditures were being exchanged for legislative votes.17
Acknowledging the Court’s “due deference” to Congress’s conclusion that a
compelling interest exists, Justice Kennedy’s opinion nevertheless emphasized
that the Court would ensure that “Congress . . . not choose an unconstitutional
remedy.”18 He underscored the absence of harmful corruption in twenty-six
states without corporate expenditure restrictions as evidence of narrow
tailoring’s absence.19
By contrast, coordinated expenditure regulations that impose a
“‘significant interference’” on speech rights must only be “‘closely drawn’” to

political contributions to candidates of between $200 and $400).
12. 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
13. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813–16 (2011). This is not entirely accurate. Independent third-party
expenditures on behalf of a privately funded candidate also triggered the match. Id.
14. Tax-exempt entities formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527 for the purpose of political lobbying.
15. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Reform as We Know It, 98 Va. L.
Rev.
(forthcoming
2012)
(manuscript
at
36–38),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829474 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing “[w]ith the opportunities for unlimited independent expenditures by outside
groups, we are likely to see political actors re-focusing away from grass-roots mobilization . . .
back to a focus on a relatively small group of ultra-wealthy donors”). But see Samuel Issacharoff,
On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 142 (2010) (“Citizens United is a distraction of
limited consequence.”); accord Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 Yale
L. & Pol’y Rev. 217, 220–22 (2011) (“Citizens United invalidated the federal ban on
corporations’ ability to advocate expressly for or against political candidates, but it did not
portend the complete collapse of other campaign finance regulation.”)
16. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
17. Id. at 910–11. Arguably, the Court’s contextual analysis is vulnerable on the facts, for
instance, in its treatment of corporate democracy. Id. at 911.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 908–09.
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match a “‘sufficiently important interest.’”20 This is a slightly looser
formulation of heightened scrutiny, although one that still demands close
means-ends tailoring. Yet even on the contribution side of the line, the Court
has never suggested that it is applying anything less than strict scrutiny, even
though it tends to uphold most regulation of campaign-related giving.21
In contrast to the campaign finance jurisprudence, the ledger of Roberts
Court cases involving restrictions on speech justified on national security
grounds has exactly one entry. In the 2010 case Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (HLP), the Court turned aside as-applied First Amendment challenges
to one of four statutes criminalizing “material support” for terrorism.22 The
material support statute plays a significant role in many criminal prosecutions
involving terrorism.23 The challenged statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, is keyed to a
list of foreign groups designated by the Secretary of State as FTOs.24 Lending
FTOs any one of a diverse list of “support or resources” is prohibited.25 As the
facts of HLP show, material support reaches (but is not limited to) First
Amendment-protected speech. For instance, the HLP plaintiffs were U.S.based not-for-profits wishing to train members of designated FTOs
(specifically, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tamil
Tigers of Eelam (LTTE)) on humanitarian and international law, on political
advocacy techniques, and about the petitioning of international bodies.26
The Court, having turned aside the HLP plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation
and vagueness arguments, rejected an as-applied free speech challenge to
§ 2339B.27 Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion does not explicitly set forth
the strict scrutiny standard or employ the precise terminology of “narrow
tailoring.” But the Court opened its analysis by rejecting the Solicitor
General’s submission that intermediate scrutiny applied on the ground that “§
2339B regulates speech on the basis of its content.”28 The Court markedly did
20. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
21. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 847–48 (noting zero percent survival rate of expenditure
limits in federal appellate courts).
22. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
23. Ctr. for Law & Sec., N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Terrorist Trial Report Card, September
11,
2001–September
11,
2010,
at
13
fig.
14
(2011),
available
at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing use of material support in high-profile prosecutions).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006) (authorizing Secretary of State, in consultation with Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury, to designate foreign group as “foreign terrorist
organization”).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (listing forms of
material support).
26. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
27. Id. at 2716–17, 2730 (noting not all applications of material support statute were before
Court).
28. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24 & n.5 (“If plaintiffs’ speech to those groups imparts a
‘specific skill’ or communicates advice derived from ‘specialized knowledge’ . . . then it is
barred. . . . On the other hand, plaintiffs’ speech is not barred if it imparts only general or
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not cite cases reviewing conduct regulations with only an incidental effect on
speech,29 which it might have invoked to resolve the case expeditiously in the
government’s favor. Subsequently, lower courts have concluded that “[t]he
Court held that strict scrutiny applied because, at least on the facts of that case,
the statute regulated speech because of its content.”30 For the purpose of this
paper, I take this characterization as a given, bracketing the question of how an
incidental effects analysis would apply.31
At the threshold, Chief Justice Roberts dealt summarily with the
compelling interest question. He explained that “the Government’s interest in
combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.”32 He
identified no other compelling government interest. In lieu of a narrow
tailoring analysis, the Court focused upon one of the implicit premises of the
blanket ban on supporting FTOs: that “any contribution to such an organization
facilitates [violence].”33 This premise, the Court suggested, underpinned
Congress’s decision to treat even forms of nonviolent support, including the
HLP plaintiffs’ speech, as criminal. The Court identified three reasons why
“Congress was justified” in that view.34 First, it posited that “[m]oney is
fungible,” and terrorist organizations lack organizational firewalls to prevent
resource diversions.35 On this point, the Court invoked a 1997 incident
involving the PKK and quoted from a 2006 monograph about the Palestinian

unspecialized knowledge.”). One might object that § 2339B is most accurately described as
drawing distinctions based on the intended audience of speech, and not on the content of the
speech itself. That formulation collapses back into the question whether the government is
entitled to distinguish between speech based on judgments about different potential audiences.
29. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367 (1968) (reviewing and upholding
application of federal statute making it illegal to burn a selective service registration card).
30. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 10-35032, 2011 WL
4424934, at *26 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011).
31. In my view, the Court was correct not to employ the O’Brien framework. Briefly, my
reason for this view turns on the fact that “material support” has been defined by Congress to
include a long list of activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (defining “material support” as “any
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses,
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel. . . , and transportation, except medicine or religious
materials”). Many of these activities are clearly not speech. But others, such as “advice” and
“training,” clearly are. And it is at least plausible to think Congress included those elements with
an aim of eliminating domestic speech supportive of the viewpoint of FTOs. To apply the
incidental effects analysis would, in effect, reward Congress for bundling speech and non-speech
prohibitions together, thereby reducing the judicial scrutiny of legislative efforts at speech
suppression. The Court may rightly have perceived that application of O’Brien would have
created an undesirable incentive for Congress to bundle together speech and non-speech rules in
the future.
32. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
33. Id. at 2724–25 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as
amended as note to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006))).
34. Id. at 2725.
35. Id. at 2725–26.
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group Hamas to support the proposition that FTOs used social and charitable
activities to hide illegal activity and to generate recruits for violence.36 The
Court also hypothesized that the HLP plaintiffs’ speech might allow the PKK
to employ international organizations “to threaten, manipulate and disrupt”
political processes.37
Second, the Court found that the proscribed forms of material support
“helps lend legitimacy” to FTOs.38 The Court did not define “legitimacy,” or
respond to Justice Breyer’s observation that many other forms of protected
activity might lend an FTO legitimacy (rendering that justification at the very
least underinclusive and hence poorly tailored).39 Third, the Court stated that
material support “strain[s] the United States’ relationships with its allies,” who
perceive “no” possibility of “legitimate” FTO activity.”40
Based on these inferences, the Court concluded that the material support
provision could lawfully be applied to any “speech under the direction of, or in
coordination with foreign groups.”41 Relevant here, and discussed further
below, this holding draws the same boundary to protected speech as the
campaign finance jurisprudence—the line between independent and
coordinated social action.42 As important as specific justifications for § 2339B
was a general claim of comparative institutional competence. The Court
emphasized that the material support bar rested “on informed judgment rather
than concrete evidence” in a domain in which “Congress and the Executive are
uniquely positioned to make principled distinctions.”43 An extended portion of
the opinion developed grounds for “deference” not just to Congress’s
judgment, but also to the Executive’s conclusions about “evolving threats in an
area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain
conduct difficult to assess.”44
Does HLP influence how the national political market operates? On the
one hand, the Court assumed that the speech at issue fell within the core of
First Amendment protection, hinting at some significant stake. Nevertheless,
36. Id. at 2725–26 (quoting M. Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the
Service of Jihad 2–3 (2006)).
37. Id. at 2729. Again, the Court relied on a secondary academic source, rather than specific
record evidence. Id. (citing A. Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for
Independence 286–95 (2007)).
38. Id. at 2725.
39. Id. at 2736–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2726 (majority opinion) (asserting
coordinated/independent speech line is “a natural stopping place” but not saying why).
40. Id. at 2726–27 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 2723 (emphasis added).
42. Recall that, in the campaign finance context, unprotected “contributions” speech
includes coordinated expenditures. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. The most
important doctrinal distinction in campaign finance law is thus between independent and
coordinated speech.
43. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2728.
44. Id. at 2727. For another instance of strict scrutiny applied in a way that seems in
retrospect quite deferential, see generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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some commentators have suggested the opinion has little practical significance
because it does not reach domestic organizations.45 Even casual observation
demonstrates, however, that foreign affairs matters occupy a meaningful
tranche of the national political debate initiated by domestic actors. Many local
and national interest groups are deeply committed to influencing U.S. policy
on foreign affairs matters implicated by FTO designations, from Ireland and
Spain to the Middle East and South Asia.46 The material support ban does not
stop such advocacy, but it does distort it. That law criminalizes interaction with
foreign entities and thereby influences what domestic interest groups can know
or do. It thus excises from the public sphere some set of speech. Consider, for
example, the designation of Iranian organizations, including the Mujahedin-e
Khaleq (MEK), that oppose the Ahmadinejad regime.47 All else being equal, a
private supporter of the MEK has ample reason to lobby Washington: The
MEK has substantial congressional support, if not quite sufficient to shrug off
FTO designation.48 But that supporter has asymmetrical incentives over the
choice of domestic lobbying tools. After HLP, it cannot consult—and perhaps
cannot even meet—the MEK. Nor can it engage in domestic lobbying based on
information thereby acquired. In this way, the material support ban subtly
changes the content and structure of the national political marketplace by
channeling the acquisition of information, networking investments, and
lobbying strategies. The magnitude of this effect, of course, is hard to
determine (although the scope of the Secretary of State’s discretionary
designation power and the breadth of resulting prohibitions imply a large
regulatory footprint). Yet such uncertainty does not obviate First Amendment
questions. It may not be clear how the regulation of political campaign
contributions and expenditures affects the speech marketplace, but still the
Court limits legislative action in the name of the First Amendment. So long as
foreign affairs are interwoven in national political affairs,49 moreover, the
distorting effect of the material support law is likely to persist.
The independent/coordinated line also leaves other traditionally protected
speech in legal peril. In oral argument before the Court in HLP, for example,
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan explained that the government believed
45. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1010 n.150
(2011) (suggesting Court’s decision, limited to foreign organizations, affords greater protection to
domestic organizations).
46. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(listing organizations designated as FTOs).
47. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 224–25 & n.2
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing history of MEK’s designations).
48. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Surprise Claim on Saddam,
Newsweek,
Oct.
17,
2004,
available
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6242223/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
49. Cf. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 947–48 (2011) (criticizing conception of First
Amendment exemplified in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as “provincial”).
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that § 2339B extended to lawyers who prepared amicus briefs on behalf of an
FTO.50 The Court’s independent/coordinated distinction thus leaves lawyers
wishing to represent FTOs facing uncertainty about their exposure to criminal
liability.
In sum, the Roberts Court’s strict scrutiny of two kinds of political speech
restrictions yields divergent results. Both strands are organized around the
same boundary line between coordinated and independent speech. The balance
of this essay considers the Court’s methodology, the mechanics of strict
scrutiny, and the downstream consequences of doctrinal choices for democratic
probity and national security.
II.
The most obvious discontinuity between the campaign finance and
material support cases is their divergent approaches to the factual predicates of
the different laws.51 Canonical accounts of strict scrutiny emphasize the close
attention courts are to pay to the factual indicia of narrow tailoring,52 and
contrast it with the looser search for “substantial evidence” that typifies
intermediate tiers of scrutiny.53 A large gap nevertheless separates the Court’s
approaches to evidentiary questions in Citizens United and HLP. While the
Citizens United Court pointed to a specific absence of evidence that the
asserted government interest was furthered by the corporate expenditure ban,54
the HLP judgment used a light touch in examining the government’s
justifications.55 This Part explores the justifications for that divide.

50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89) (“[T]o the extent that a lawyer drafts an amicus brief for the
PKK or for the LTTE . . . then that indeed would be prohibited.”). But see Am. Airways Charter,
Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding government did not
have power to determine whether lawyer could form an attorney-client relationship with Cuban
government, which was subject to sanctions). Current regulations issued by the Treasury
department under another federal designation statute create safe harbors for lawyers providing
legal services directly to designated entities. See 29 C.F.R. § 403.9 (2011) (exempting attorneyclient communications from disclosure rules).
51. Procedural form is an important entailment of the First Amendment in application. Cf.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (requiring
appellate courts hearing speech cases to conduct independent review of facts); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) (noting “procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law”).
52. See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) (“Deference
to a legislative funding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.”).
53. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 208 (1997); see also Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (holding in intermediate scrutiny cases “courts must
accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress”).
54. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910–11 (2010).
55. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting absence of “evidence that
Congress has made [an informed] judgment regarding the specific activities at issue in these
cases”).
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To begin, there is an obvious doctrinal explanation. As noted above, there
are divergent standards of strictness in the review of regulations of independent
and coordinated speech.56 HLP plainly falls into the latter camp. A first cut at
explaining the Court’s different approaches in Citizens United and HLP would
stress the different doctrinal treatment of independent and coordinated speech.
But this doctrinal explanation does not do sufficient work to explain the
divergence between those cases. This is seen most clearly by focusing closely
on the HLP case. Even read as an exercise in determining whether the material
support law was “‘closely drawn’” to match a “‘sufficiently important
interest,’”57 the majority opinion in HLP falls far short of cogent and complete
explanation. Chief Justice Roberts endorsed Congress’s conclusion that
material support for nonviolent activities “frees up other resources within the
organization that may be put to violent ends.”58 Without asking specifically
whether the plaintiff’s proposed speech acts in HLP could be a substitute for
the support of LTTE or PKK’s terrorist activity,59 the Court focused primarily
on the fungibility of cash transfers (not at issue in the case) for Hamas (also not
implicated in the case).60 The Court further assumed what was true of Hamas
was also true of other FTOs. But the category of FTOs is not a natural kind. It
is a construction of executive branch policy choice. Nothing in the statute
requires the State Department to bestow FTO status only when an organization
fails to preserve appropriate internal firewalls. What is true of one FTO’s
internal structure and operation might not be true of others. At best then, the
Court demonstrated the statute’s justification was plausible, not that it was
“closely drawn.”61
Moreover, although the Court framed its analysis around the compelling
interest in “combating terrorism” directed toward the United States, much of
what followed in fact turned on the distinct, foreign-affairs related Government
interest in maintaining cordial relations with countries such as Turkey and Sri
Lanka.62 Chief Justice Roberts thus explained that an absolute ban on material
support to the PKK was warranted because of the risk that Turkey “would react
sharply” to private American support for the Kurdish separatist movement.63
56. See supra text accompanying notes 16–21 (describing different standards of review).
57. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
58. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
59. The Court speculated that the PKK “could . . . pursue peaceful negotiations as a means
of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks.” Id. at 2729. Whether or not this is an
accurate reading of the historical record, it is a prediction that relies on a piling of inference upon
inference to reach the conclusion that the HLP plaintiffs’ actions could facilitate violence. Nor is
it clear how this conclusion applies to the teaching of international law.
60. Id. at 2726–25.
61. The Court’s oblique citations to past behavior of the PKK and LTTE, see id. at 2726,
only partly remedy this gap.
62. Compare id. at 2724 (describing government interest in fighting terror as an “objective
of the highest order”), with id. at 2726 (describing importance of “cooperative efforts between
nations to prevent terrorist attacks”).
63. Id. at 2726–27.
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As Justice Breyer noted, it seems odd to treat “the fact that other nations may
like us less” as a pass to restricting First Amendment speech.64 At a minimum,
this illustrates the HLP Court’s surprisingly cavalier attitude toward the
government’s to shuffling between putative compelling interests. It also
reflects a surprising inattention to the comparative strength of state interests
that range from preventing terrorist attacks in the United States to maintaining
good relations with states in the Indian Ocean.
In light of these elements in the HLP decision, it cannot be said that the
Court’s light touch in that case is solely explained by the more relaxed judicial
approach to coordinated speech. Even accounting for that relaxation of
scrutiny, the HLP Court’s version of strict scrutiny is strikingly forgiving.
Indeed, it is barely recognizable as strict scrutiny at all given the Court’s
express acceptance of loosely defined and evolving governmental goals on the
one hand and predictions instead of facts on the other.
Other explanations for the deference gap between Citizens United and
HLP also founder. The looser review used in HLP might be defended, for
example, by pointing out that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”65 But both
campaign finance laws and material support provisions respond to problems
with long historical pedigrees. It is not clear one is more familiar or credible
than the other.
Alternatively, the Court’s dialing down of factual scrutiny in HLP might
be explained as a reflection of the large expected cost of terrorism and the
relatively small expected cost of corruption induced by electoral spending in a
democratic system.66 Stated otherwise, the high stakes of terrorism force
greater deference. But this too is not clearly true. It is at least arguable that the
magnitude of terrorism’s total social cost for the United States is less than is
generally believed (particularly where the LTTE and PKK rather than, say, al
Qaeda, are concerned).67 And it is also not clear why what one scholar has
called “the anti-corruption principle,” which has a long and robust pedigree in

64. Id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
66. Even though, as I just observed, the logic of HLP turns as much on foreign policy
concerns that are legitimately subject to domestic democratic contestation as it does on security
from terrorism.
67. There is a tendency to see all terrorist attacks as akin to 9/11. But serious terrorism
incidents comprise a small fraction of the universe of actual terrorism. Since 1978, only 118
incidents of terrorism worldwide have killed more than 100 people. This is only 0.12% percent of
the 98,000 terrorist events in that period. National Consortium for the Study and Responses to
Terrorism,
Global
Terrorism
Database,
available
at
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1978&end_yearonly=2010&st
art_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asm
Select1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=f&casualties_max=101http://www.start.umd.e
du/gtd/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
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American history, should be given such short shrift.68 Stated otherwise, public
tolerance for the violent actions of FTOs with a purely foreign reach might in
fact be much greater than zero (think of the IRA), whereas our constitutional
tradition might be glossed to suggest that tolerance for distortions in political
representation from the democratic ideal should be minimal. However intuitive
it may be to assume without reflection that national security must be the more
pressing interest, it is by no means clear why this should be so in respect to the
material support law. If the Court’s divergent approaches to factual scrutiny do
rest on some implicit hierarchy of the interests furthered respectively by
campaign finance and material support laws, then it is at the least incumbent
on the Justices to explain how they have prioritized policy priorities, and to
defend that judgment explicitly. The Roberts Court has offered no such
explanation.
Finally, the difference in the Court’s approach might be justified on
comparative institutional competence grounds.69 In HLP, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked the “sensitive and weighty” nature of security questions, and the
presumption that the political branches are skilled at assessing “evolving
threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain.”70 By contrast,
Roberts Court campaign finance cases are haunted by a pervasive “mistrust of
governmental power”71 and by a specific suspicion that regulation is motivated
by incumbency protection.72 This asymmetrical economy of suspicion,
however, rests on unconvincing foundations, even though it is invoked so
frequently that it has almost become a truism. As an initial matter, both
national security and campaign financing involve government lock-up power.
Whatever expertise the executive might have, this should raise libertarian red
flags given the possibility of both good and bad actors at the helm of the
executive. More to the point, the HLP Court’s analysis of the welfare
consequences of terrorism is lopsided. The Court accounts for the pros of
political control of security matters but ignores the long history of
constitutional rights violations premised on perceived foreign threats.73 It also
takes no account of incumbent politicians’ potent incentives to manipulate
security concerns for partisan gain. In other words, the Court engages in costbenefit analysis without costs.
Nor is it clear that the actual degree of government expertise makes the
68. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341,
342 (2009) (“The Constitution carries within it an anti-corruption principle, much like the
separation-of-powers principle, or federalism. It is a freestanding principle embedded in the
Constitution’s structure, and should be given independent weight . . . .”).
69. See, e.g., HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727–29 (discussing judicial deference toward executive
decisions concerning national security and foreign affairs).
70. Id. at 2727.
71. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
72. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 637, 644 n.9
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[H]istory demonstrates that the most significant effect of
election reform has been not to purify public service, but to protect incumbents . . . .”).
73. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the
Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (2004) (recounting history).
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risk of error in national security matters any less than in other policy domains.
To the contrary, recent accounts of post-9/11 policy underscore institutional
blundering, myopia, and catastrophic miscalculation through the past decade.74
By contrast, the Court often overstates the case for suspicion of campaign
finance regulation. In Arizona Free Enterprise, for example, it extended the
presumption of skepticism predicated on a fear of legislators’ incumbencyprotection motives to measures adopted by popular referendum, where
legislators’ self-dealing motives play no role.75 A logic of comparative
institutional advantage, in short, cannot reconcile the differences between the
two lines of cases.
To summarize, the Roberts Court’s strict scrutiny encompasses
qualitatively different sorts of factual inquiry in the testing of restraints on
different kinds of political speech. Although recent studies of strict scrutiny
have identified such variance,76 they have not explored its normative
justifications within a single doctrinal domain. Attention to the divergent
approaches to First Amendment strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court suggests
the bifurcation to be at best undertheorized and at worst unjustified.
III.
If the Roberts Court’s deployments of First Amendment strict scrutiny
have a plural and inconstant character, they are also characterized by important
doctrinal commonalities. Recall that in Part I, I emphasized parallels between
the doctrinal structure in the campaign finance and national security cases, in
particular the doctrinal distinction between coordination and independent
action. The line between more and less protected speech in both domains, that
is, is given by the border between coordinated speech and independent speech,
making it easier for government to penalize speech in association with others
than to punish discrete and independent speech.77 But does this doctrinal
equality cash out as equal protection for speakers? Formal symmetry of
doctrinal protection, I suggest here, hides differential downstream effects on
speakers’ options and the government’s regulatory options. What in the
campaign finance context weakens government and empowers speakers has the
opposite effect in the national security context, where it shifts authority from
private to public hands.

74. See, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America
and al-Qaeda 120 (2011) (characterizing “President Bush’s extralegal approach to the war on
terrorism” as “unnecessary and counterproductive”).
75. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2845
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing democratic credentials of public financing system
invalidated in that case).
76. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 829, 845 (presenting data).
77. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 45, at 1006 (arguing that historical First Amendment protection
is explained by greater solicitude for “speech in the context of public assemblies or political
organizations”).
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In the campaign finance context, it has long been argued that drawing a
line between permissible regulation of coordinated political action and a
protected zone of sheltered independent initiative has a perverse “hydraulic”
effect.78 In other words, commentators have argued that campaign funding
stops flowing via actors such as candidates and parties, and instead courses
through less transparent “political action committees (PACs), the 527s, and all
the rest.”79 Extending that argument, one critique of Citizens United suggests
that the decision’s “removal of longstanding restriction on independent
expenditures is causing money rapidly to return to the least regulated, least
restricted pathways.”80 Drawing a line between contributions and expenditures
in the campaign finance context thus saps government’s ability to regulate
comprehensively in a way that responds to possible circumvention.81
The coordinated/independent campaign finance speech line also means
that private actors still have substitutes for prohibited speech acts.82 To be
sure, an independent expenditure may not have the specific expressive content
of a contribution to a party or candidate. But a person or corporation barred
from making a contribution has a ready substitute in the form of independent
expenditures, whether their motives are good or bad. Wishing to aid a
candidate or party, a well-motivated speaker will frequently be able to identify
campaign messages that benefit the favored entity even absent coordination.
An ill-motivated (and sufficiently wealthy) speaker seeking to create a
relationship of dependency or privileged access can also use expenditures to
that end, albeit with each dollar being perhaps marginally less effective than a
dollar of contribution.83
The effects of the coordinated speech/independent expenditure line on the
speech at issue in HLP are almost at the opposite pole from those observed in
the campaign finance context. Use of coordination to demarcate bounds to
protected speech expands the authority of the government because the range of
possible substitutions for either well-intentioned or ill-intentioned actors is
small. Recall that the HLP plaintiffs sought to teach and advise designated
groups about international law and political advocacy.84 It is hard to see how
the HLP plaintiffs could substitute these necessarily coordinated actions with
independent speech. It would be too quick to say they could simply write
books or blog on the topic. (By that logic, law professors should pack up shop
78. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1708 (1999) (defining hydraulic account of campaign finance).
79. Issacharoff, supra note 15 at 120.
80. Kang, supra note 15, at 3.
81. This brackets the question of whether disclosure is an effective substitute for direct
regulation.
82. In other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, the availability of “ample alternative
channels for communication” is part of the formal doctrinal framework. Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (describing doctrinal
framework for time, place, and manner restrictions).
83. For an example of a campaign contribution being treated as having a corrupting effect,
see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
84. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2010).
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today and leave students to Gilberts and Emanuels.85) Pedagogy conducted in
person, like speech accomplished in unison with like-minded others, has a
value that outpaces its close competitors. At the same time, ill-intentioned
actors, who wish to aid an FTO’s terrorism by subventing its nonviolent
activities, also have no plausible substitute. The full spectrum of acts they wish
to engage in is prohibited by the material support law. Potential speakers in the
national security domain, unlike political actors laboring under the current
campaign finance dispensation, cannot plausibly substitute out of the regulated
domain of speech for either good or bad reasons. Use of coordination to draw
the edges of protected speech in the security context therefore expands the
regulatory authority of the government and as a result likely reduces the
aggregate volume of both good and bad private speech—precisely the opposite
of what is observed in the campaign finance context.
In passing, it bears notice that the narrowing gyre of constitutional
protection instigated by HLP can also be discerned in its effect on the rule
against “guilt by association.” That protection took doctrinal form as a
prohibition on the criminalization of membership absent evidence of a specific
intent to further an organization’s illegal aims.86 The HLP Court made short
work of the specific intent rule. It argued, somewhat tautologically, that
§ 2339B “does not criminalize mere membership,” but rather material
support.87 After HLP, the rule against guilt by association thus only reaches
“mere” membership. If a member teaches another member about international
law or political advocacy, if they coordinate advocacy to ensure consistency, or
if they offer a penny in dues, constitutional protection falls away. By revealing
the “guilt by association” rule to be only penurious shelter against state
penalties, the HLP Court clarified how small the domain of protected political
speech is when a trace of political subversion is in play.88
In sum, formal homology of doctrinal protection in the campaign finance
and national security domains hides functional dissonance. For practical
purposes, a coordination boundary renders the state’s reach on campaign
finance matters underinclusive in relation to the state’s putative goals. By
contrast, the identical doctrinal rule applied to national security matters yields
a governmental grasp that is significantly overinclusive in relation to the state’s
notional goals in that domain. By adopting a coordination boundary to
protected speech, campaign finance cases assume no regulatory overbreadth is
85. Perhaps they should. This too might be socially desirable in a way I am too biased to
perceive.
86. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1961) (discussing constitutional
limitations on criminalizing association).
87. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
88. Accord David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 233 (“[A]ssociation would be an empty formality
without the conduct that brings people together—meeting, raising funds, engaging in volunteer
work, and the like—and therefore to limit the right of association to the formal act of joining a
group would eviscerate the right.”).
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acceptable, while national security cases take overbreadth to be self-evidently
acceptable.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the Roberts Court’s political speech cases suggests that the
notionally rigid box of “strict scrutiny” fails to impose much by way of
constraint on judicial discretion. There is a striking divergence between the
Court’s magnanimously gestures of broad deference to elected actors in the
national security domain and its beady-eyed skepticism in the campaign
finance context. That stark contrast cannot be explained on doctrinal or
comparative institutional competence grounds alone. Rather, it reflects an
implicit hierarchy of normative judgment about policy priorities related to
political speech that is only half-exposed to public view. The Court’s
consistent use of a coordination/independent speech line also has subtly
divergent effects in different domains that promote those same policy
priorities. The net consequence of the Court’s sometimes consistent/sometimes
inconsistent approach to political speech is a subtle pressure in favor of
speakers and forms of speech of which the Court approves. Far from acting as
an umpire in these speech cases,89 therefore, the Court appears to be in the
business of pursuing a singularly normative vision of the democratic order
packaged with an implicit hierarchy of more or less legitimate speakers, all of
whom are notionally sheltered by the First Amendment. By building these
judgments into a hermetic doctrinal framework, the Justices exercise influence
in oblique and indirect ways. Their normative judgments need never be
articulated or defended. Whatever one thinks the appropriate role of courts in a
constitutional democracy should be, it is difficult to discern how this could be
the best way to delineate a constitutionally protected domain for political
speech.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Aziz Z. Huq
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
huq@uchicago.edu
89. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“[M]y job [is] to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch
or bat.”).
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